At Least $200M Worth of Microchips, Military and Dual-Use Equipment Reached Russia via Hong Kong
A network of trading and shell companies systematically supplies European technologies to Russia.
Through a series of Hong Kong trading and fictitious front companies, the Kremlin continues to receive European technologies predominantly used only in military systems. This conclusion was reached in the report “Bypassing the Blockade: How Hong Kong Feeds European Technology Into Russia’s War in Ukraine,” published by the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong (CFHK Foundation).
Researchers analyzed Hong Kong and Russian customs data, company registries, and field reports from Ukrainian military personnel on components recovered from Russian weapons. The total documented value of supplies exceeds $200 million.
The report analyzed only so-called “high-priority” goods — those listed on the Common High Priority Items List (CHPL), which enumerates technologies most needed by Russia for its military operations in Ukraine — and only products from select European companies: 23 headquartered in Europe, plus 5 Polish subsidiaries of global manufacturers. These include Dutch firms Nexperia and NXP Semiconductors, French companies Thales and Michelin, German firms Infineon Technologies and Siemens, British firm Harwin, Swiss firm ST Microelectronics, and others.
Microcontrollers for Missiles, Semiconductors, and Connectors: What Russia Buys Through Hong Kong
The largest volume of supplies by value came from Swiss company STMicroelectronics. Customs documents from March 2022 through February 2024 show over 7,600 shipments through Hong Kong to Russia totaling $80.2 million. The vast majority of products were manufactured not in Europe but at STMicroelectronics facilities in Malaysia, China, and Morocco — significantly complicating their tracking under existing export restrictions. A similar situation applies to products from other European companies.
A significant portion of STMicroelectronics products has been found in a wide range of Russian weapons, including Shahed/Geran attack drones.
Dutch semiconductor manufacturers Nexperia and NXP Semiconductors have been found in cruise missiles, drones, electronic warfare systems, and fire control devices. In particular, an NXP microcontroller was found in the Korean KN-24 ballistic missile used by Russia. Customs records show 5,363 and 3,957 cargo shipments through Hong Kong totaling $12.4 million and $26.2 million respectively.
Among German companies, the report highlights Infineon Technologies (8,509 shipments, $55.6 million), Würth Elektronik (components found in the Kinzhal missile and radio jammers), and Harting (connectors found in Iskander missiles).
Non-Random Traders
One of the report’s key findings is the critical concentration of trade flows in the hands of a few Hong Kong companies. As the authors note, this creates obvious enforcement “bottlenecks” that are currently being practically ignored by regulators.
The most active player is Woeroon Electronic Sourcing Ltd. and its affiliated Shenzhen Woeroon. Between 2022 and 2024, they accounted for over 25,000 shipments to Russia totaling $27.9 million (not limited to products from the analyzed companies). Woeroon appears as one of the top five suppliers for 18 of the 28 analyzed manufacturers. Yet no jurisdiction — neither the EU, the UK, the US, nor Switzerland — has imposed sanctions on the firm. The company operates through a network of legally separate but operationally connected companies sharing common addresses and directors.
[Corporate Network of Woeroon, Chipgoo and Related Hong Kong and Shenzhen Entities]
Second place goes to YW NL E-Commerce Company — over 22,000 shipments totaling $18.8 million. The company advertises specific European semiconductor brands on its websites, including Russian-language versions. Currently, YW NL is sanctioned only by the United Kingdom.
Euro Asia Cargo and its partner Teleporter Express processed approximately 8,800 shipments totaling $19.1 million. 92% of Euro Asia’s shipments were declared under the name of Teleporter Express — a company that has yet to appear on any sanctions list.
[Cargo Count to Russia by Hong Kong Supplier of Goods from EU-Headquartered Manufacturers Examined in this Report]
On the Russian side, the situation is analogous — the bulk of all products is received by a small number of Russian legal entities, most of which are also currently not under sanctions. These are LLC Saturn Telecom, Orca, Snabinter, Power Telecom, and AR Logistik.
[Sanctions Status of High-Volume Importers of CHPL European Goods]
Systemic Gaps: Three Reasons for Sanctions Policy Ineffectiveness
The report’s authors identify three fundamental flaws in the current sanctions architecture.
First, sanctions measures are primarily aimed at individual legal entities rather than corporate networks. This allows for the swift registration of new structures after being added to sanctions lists.
Second, governments very rarely impose personal sanctions on specific individuals. Owners and directors of key offending companies remain outside the sanctions framework even after their companies are listed.
Third, the infrastructure that traders rely upon — banks, logistics operators, freight brokers, and corporate service companies — effectively escapes sanctions, even when systematically servicing supplies to Russia.
[Sanctions status of Hong Kong CHPL suppliers to Russia]
Commenting on the report, Mark Clifford, president of the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, stated: “Hong Kong plays a vital role in Russia’s war against Ukraine by allowing weapons components to be transported through the city in violation of sanctions. Hong Kong’s leaders must be held accountable for their cynical indifference to the deaths of Ukrainians on the battlefield.”
The foundation’s president also emphasized the need for stricter oversight by manufacturers of key technological equipment and military products and their supply through Hong Kong:
“Europeans need to understand that Hong Kong is deliberately helping the Russian enemy. The EU and European states must stop the flow of military components moving through the city. We need to see serious scrutiny of supplies going through the Chinese port and greater accountability from European manufacturers who have proven unable to control the end use of their products,” Clifford added.